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WHEN IS PROPERTY INTELLECTUAL?
THE LEVERAGING PROBLEM
MARK R. PATFRSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Patents and copyrights protect inventions and expression; they do not
protect products. This distinction, I argue in this essay, is a key to the
difficult antitrust problem of the "leveraging" of intellectual property.' In a
typical leveraging case, the manufacturer of a durable good, like a copier or
computer, refuses to sell replacement parts for its equipment unless the
purchaser also hires the manufacturer to service the equipment. Such a
practice can be illegal under antitrust law,2 but when the leveraging
products-in this example, replacement parts-are protected by patent or
copyright, the manufacturer will often claim that the leveraging is a
permissible use of its intellectual property.
The validity of this intellectual property defense is disputed, as two
recent cases illustrate.3  In Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., the Ninth Circuit held that although an intellectual property
owner's desire to profit from leveraging its intellectual property is
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The Ohio State University,
B.S.E.E., 1978, M.S. 1980; Stanford Law School, J.D., 1991. I am grateful for helpful comments from
Sergio Baches Opi, Mark Lemley, Gideon Parchomovsky, and Steve Thel. The Fordham University
School of Law provided valuable financial assistance.
1. This problem has prompted other recent commentary. See Symposium, Intellectual Property
Rights and Federal Antitrust Policy, 24 J. CoRP. L. 477 (1999); Ronald W. Davis, The FTC's Intel
Case: What Are the Limitations on "Throwing Your Weight Around" Using Intellectual Property
Rights?, ANTITRUST, Summer 1999, at 47; Charles L. Freed, Antitrust and the Duty to License
Intellectual Property-Can Manufacturers Be Compelled to Deal with ISOs?, ANTITRUST, Fall 1999, at
33. For commentary addressing more generally the intersection between antitrust law and intellectual
property law, see sources cited infra note 15.
2. The practice could be illegal either as a tying arrangement or an instance of monopoly
leveraging. See infra notes 16-17.
3. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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presumptively legitimate, the presumption can be rebutted.4 Because the
court concluded that Kodak "was not actually motivated by protecting its
intellectual property rights,"5 it affirmed the antitrust verdict against
Kodak. In contrast, the district court in In re Independent Service
Organizations Antitrust Litigation (Xerox)6 rejected the Ninth Circuit's
focus on the intellectual property owner's intent,7 and held that the owner
was entitled to profits derived from denying its intellectual property in as
many markets as the denial was profitable.8 This decision was recently
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, which accorded intellectual property
owners similar freedom.
9
The approach to this problem that I propose is supported by statements
made in each of these cases. In Kodak, the court said that "patent and
copyright holders may refuse to sell or license protected work."10
Similarly, in Xerox, the district court said that "patent holders [have] the
right to exclude others from... their inventions."11  The common, and
commonly neglected, element in these statements is the focus on the
"protected work," i.e., the patented invention or the copyrighted
expression.12  Neither court considers, at least explicitly, whether an
intellectual property owner's right to deny access to its "protected work"
gives it the right to deny access to any product in which that work is
embodied.
I argue in this essay that intellectual property rights should provide
special protection from the antitrust laws only when the owner of the rights
is truly denying access to its intellectual property. That will never be the
4. 125 F.3d 1195,1218 (9th Cir. 1997), on remand from 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
5. Id. at 1219.
6. In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.), 989 F. Supp.
1131 (D. Kan. 1997), aff'd, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
7. Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1140-41.
8. Id. at 1134-39. Other courts have taken similarly broad approaches. See Miller Insituform,
Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645
F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981).
9. See Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Federal Circuit did acknowledge one
limitation, observing that "the patent holder cannot use his statutory right to refuse to sell patented parts
to gain a monopoly in a market beyond the scope of the patent." Id. at 1327 (citing Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). But it appeared to confine that
limitation to tying agreements. See id.
10. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1215 (emphasis added).
11. Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1136 (emphasis added).
12. The same focus appears in commentary on this issue, where it also is not explicitly
acknowledged. See David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 24
J. CoRP. L. 485, 491 (1999) ("I define cases of pure exclusion as those in which the owner of a valid
intellectual property right, validly obtained, unilaterally refuses to sell or license the technology covered
by the right to a party wishing to obtain the technology.") (emphasis added).
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case when the owner's property is denied to one who will not use the
intellectual property. In Kodak and Xerox, independent service
organizations sought access to the defendants' patented parts only in order
to install them in the equipment of others. It was the equipment owners,
not the service organizations, that benefited from any inventions embodied
in those parts. Hence, the defendants' patents should not have allowed
them to deny the parts to the service organizations.
Somewhat more broadly, intellectual property also should not allow
owners of the property to discriminate among potential buyers or licensees
if those buyers or licensees do not differ in their uses of the intellectual
element of the property. That is, not only should a patent or copyright not
give its owner the right to deny a product to one who would not use the
invention or expression, but it also should not give the owner the right to
deny the product to one who would use the protected work if the owner at
the same time grants access to others who use it in the same way. Such
discrimination where there is no difference in the use of the protected
aspect of the property does not rest on a denial of access to the owner's
intellectual property. A similar conclusion was in fact reached, though on
somewhat different reasoning, in the Federal Trade Commission's recent
case challenging Intel Corporation's licensing practices.
1 3
I should note that my purpose in this essay is to address only whether
an intellectual property owner's leveraging is truly a use of the intellectual
aspect of its property. Even if an owner's refusal to deal is truly a denial of
the owner's invention or expression, it might be appropriate to condemn
the denial for other reasons. For example, the denial might constitute one
of the other forms of exploitation of intellectual property that constitute
"misuse."14  Or, more generally, it might be that some denials of
intellectual property create monopolies whose costs outweigh the benefits
of the incentives produced by those denials. 15 I do not seek to address
13. See infra Part V.C.
14. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTrrRUsT POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACrICE 240 (2d ed. 1999) ("Many, but not all, instances of patent misuse are practices analogous
to unlawful tying arrangements....") (citing cases). The law of misuse is discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes 22-25.
15. For more general analyses of the intersection of patent law and antitrust, see WARD S.
BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW (1973); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on
Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE LJ. 267 (1966); Louis Kaplow,
The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984). For more recent
work, focusing particularly on the problems of "network" industries, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995);
McGowan, supra note 12; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000).
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these more general problems here, but only to suggest that some instances
of leveraging are not properly treated as involving intellectual property at
all.
II. THE LAW OF LEVERAGING
The leading antitrust tying case defines "leverage" as "'a supplier's
power to induce his customer for one product to buy a second product from
him that would not otherwise be purchased solely on the merit of that
second product." '16  "Monopoly leveraging" is defined similarly, as "the
use of monopoly power attained in one market to gain a competitive
advantage in another... ."17 It is generally when two markets are linked in
16. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 n.20 (1984) (quoting 5 Piuua
AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPCATION 1134a, at 202 (1980)). Although the Court has never set out the elements of a
tying violation, there appear to be four: (1) separate tying and tied products (2) that are tied together
(3) by means of coercion derived from the tying seller's market power in the tying product (4) in such a
way as to affect a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied product. See Jefferson
Parish, 466 U.S. at 9-15; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62
(1992).
Tying is a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, but section 1 condemns only
anticompetitive agreements. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (condemning "[e]very contract,
combination .... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade"). Some leveraging arrangements involve no
agreement, though, as when a manufacturer implements a unilateral policy of selling parts only to
equipment owners that use its service (rather than entering into a contract with owners requiring them to
use its service). In such instances, a challenge could be brought under a monopoly leveraging theory
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which requires no agreement. The validity of monopoly leveraging
claims is discussed infra note 17.
17. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979). Although
monopoly leveraging claims have been approved by some courts under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
the status of monopoly leveraging as an independent antitrust theory is uncertain. On the one hand, the
Second Circuit explicitly said in Berkey Photo that such a claim is possible "even if there has not been
an attempt to monopolize the second market," id. at 276, and other circuits have agreed. See Kerasotes
Michigan Theatres, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc. 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988) (accepting the
possibility of a monopoly leveraging claim); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Community
Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing dismissal of monopoly leveraging claim). On the other
hand, other circuits have said that a monopoly leveraging claim is valid only where the elements of an
attempt-to-monopolize claim are present, which would require a showing not just that the defendant
gained a competitive advantage in the leveraged market, but that it had a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power in that market. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d
536,546-49 (9th Cir. 1991); Fimeman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 203-06 (3d Cir.
1992). See also Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Prof'l
Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1551 n.8 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting split in circuits); Twin Lab., Inc. v.
Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1990) (characterizing some of the statements
regarding leveraging in Berkey Photo as dicta).
The Supreme Court's statements on this issue are similarly ambiguous. On the one hand, the
Court has made some statements that appear to accept the possibility of monopoly leveraging claims.
See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (stating that "the use of monopoly power,
however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a
1136
2000] LEVERAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1137
this way that the problems that are the subject of this essay arise, though
one can imagine similar uses of intellectual property in single-market
contexts.
18
The Supreme Court has been quite willing to discourage leveraging
even where the seller's power is a product of intellectual property. In two
of the earliest tying cases, International Salt Co. v. United States19 and
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,20 the tying products involved
patented machines and copyrighted films, respectively. In each case, the
defendant sought to use its intellectual property to increase sales of another
product, and in each case the Supreme Court affirmed liability.
Furthermore, the Court has recently said that "power gained through some
natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen
can give rise to [antitrust] liability if a seller exploits his dominant position
in one market to expand his empire into the next."21
Intellectual property law has also discouraged leveraging. Indeed, the
early antitrust tying cases relied on even earlier patent infringement cases
in which the Court found patent misuse.2 2  The misuse doctrine was
described broadly in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.:
The necessities or convenience of the patentee do not justify any use of
the monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly. The fact that the
competitor, is unlawful"). On the other hand, the Court has recently said that an attempted
monopolization claim requires proof that the defendant has a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). Some have
concluded that this eliminated monopoly leveraging as an independent claim.
I have argued elsewhere that a plaintiff could claim that leveraging is monopolization (rather than
attempted monopolization), in that leveraging allows the defendant to maintain its power in the
leveraging market, see Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing
Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTrnUST LJ. 1 (1997), but the success of such an argument is
uncertain. However, my goal here is to reconcile antitrust law and intellectual property law in the
leveraging context, not to define when leveraging can be challenged under the antitrust laws.
18. For example, the Robinson-Patman Act makes price discrimination in the sale of
"commodities" illegal, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994), but it does not restrict discriminatory prices in
intellectual property licenses. See infra note 44. Thus, one could imagine that a seller seeking to price-
discriminate might incorporate in its commodity a patented invention so as to be able to distribute its
product through licenses that are discriminatorily priced, even if the invention added no value to the
product.
19. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
20. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
21. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,480 n.29 (1992) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
22. See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 157 (citing Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309
U.S. 436, 459 (1940); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942); Mercoid Corp.
v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944)); International Salt, 332 U.S. at 396 (citing
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,
320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)).
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patentee has the power to refuse a license does not enable him to enlarge
the monopoly of the patent by the expedient of attaching conditions to its
use. The method by which the monopoly is sought to be extended is
immaterial. The patent is a privilege. But it is a privilege which is
conditioned by a public purpose. It results from invention and is limited
to the invention which it defines. When the patentee ties something else
to his invention, he acts only by virtue of his right as the owner of
property to make contracts concerning it and not otherwise. He then is
subject to all the limitations upon that right which the general law
imposes upon such contracts. The contract is not saved by anything in
the patent laws because it relates to the invention. If it were, the mere
act of the patentee could make the distinctive claim of the patent attach
to something which does not possess the quality of invention. Then the
patent would be diverted from its statutory purpose and become a ready
instrument for economic control in domains where the anti-trust acts or
other laws, not the patent statutes, define the public policy.
23
The Court has since narrowed the misuse doctrine to apply only to
extensions of the patent monopoly to staple goods-that is, goods that have
commercial uses other than in connection with the patented invention.
24
More recently, however, several Courts of Appeals have extended the
misuse doctrine from its original patent context to copyright cases.
25
The impetus for these antitrust and intellectual property doctrines is
the concern that leveraging provides the intellectual property owner with a
greater return than is necessary. Although intellectual property law grants
monopolies in order to provide an incentive for the creation of inventions
and expression, those monopolies are limited, because the goal of the law is
to create the incentive while imposing no higher a monopoly cost than is
necessary. The fear is that leveraging, by extending the intellectual
property grant, may provide too great an incentive, and thus impose too
high a cost.
Unfortunately, we simply do not know how much incentive is enough,
or what cost is too high.26 Therefore, just as permitting leveraging might
allow excessive monopoly overcharges, forbidding it might create
23. 320 U.S. 661,666 (1944) (internal citations omitted).
24. See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,184 (1980). The Court relied
on 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), see discussion infra Part IV.A, and concluded that in that statute "[t]he approach
that Congress took toward the codification of contributory infringement and patent misuse reveals a
compromise between those two doctrines and their competing policies that permits patentees to exercise
control over nonstaple articles used in their inventions." Dawson, 448 U.S. at 200.
25. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); DSC Communications
Corp. v. DGI Techs., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996).
26. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1818-20, 1833-34.
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insufficient incentives. 27 For that reason, in recent decisions some courts
have held that a seller's desire to exclude others from its intellectual
property is a presumptively valid justification for leveraging.2 8 The district
court in Xerox went even further, stating categorically that "a patent
holder's unilateral refusal to sell or license its patented invention does not
constitute unlawful exclusionary conduct under the antitrust laws even if
the refusal impacts competition in more than one relevant antitrust
market."
29
Both of these approaches are too simplistic, as Louis Kaplow has
pointed out.3 0 Neither makes a real attempt to determine the proper
balance of the benefits from the creation of intellectual property and the
costs of monopoly overcharges. Instead, the courts just choose one option
or the other,31 and many commentators do the same.32  One resolution of
the problem would be to attempt an explicit balancing of the costs and
benefits of the intellectual property grant for each case, as Kaplow has
discussed.33  Although this approach might be the ideal, Kaplow
acknowledges that it is likely to be very difficult to implement.
34
The Kodak court's focus on intent is one possible alternative. Instead
of trying to determine the proper economic balance, the court relied on
what it viewed as evidence that "Kodak was not actually motivated by
protecting its intellectual property rights."35 Presumably, the court's
rationale was that if Kodak was not motivated in its leveraging by
protecting its intellectual property, whatever return it reaped from that
leveraging would not, or at least did not, serve to provide the creative
27. This was a concern of the Ninth Circuit in Kodak:
Particularly where treble damages are possible, [antitrust claims based on unilateral refusals
to sell or license intellectual property] will detract from the advantages lawfully granted to the
holders of patents or copyrights by subjecting them to the cost and risk of lawsuits based upon
the effect, on an arguably separate market, of their refusal to sell or license. The cost of such
suits will reduce a patent holder's 'incentive... to risk the often enormous costs in terms of
time, research, and development.'
125 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480 (1974)).
28. See Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1195; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d
1147, 1187 (lst Cir. 1994).
29. Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1139.
30. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1845-49.
31. That is, antitrust tying law and the misuse doctrines choose to limit the monopoly overcharge
by policing the limits of the intellectual property owner's monopoly, and the Xerox case seeks to ensure
that there is sufficient incentive for the creation of intellectual property by allowing the intellectual
property owner to reap profits wherever they are available.
32. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1845-55 (discussing commentary).
33. See id. at 1825-27.
34. See id. at 1842-45.
35. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1219.
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incentive that is the raison d'gtre for intellectual property. Although that
rationaie is not incontestable,36 it seems at least plausible. The Kodak test
has the weakness, however, of turning on the intellectual property owner's
subjective motivation, which will always be difficult to determine.37
I propose here an alternative approach, but one that also asks whether
the leveraging is truly a use of intellectual property. The underlying
rationale of this approach is similar to Kodak's, in that it avoids a difficult
economic balancing in favor of an assessment of whether intellectual
property is truly involved. However, my proposal differs from Kodak's
approach, and I believe improves upon it, in two respects. First, by
focusing not on intent but on actual business practice, it replaces Kodak's
subjective test with an objective one. Second, by focusing on the one to
whom the work would be denied rather than on the owner of the work, the
proposal seeks to ensure that the return on intellectual property is related to
its value.
III. LEVERAGING AND THE USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The basic insight of the test proposed here can be captured in a
variation on the typical leveraging scenario. Assume, as described in the
introduction of this essay, that the manufacturer of a durable good faces
competition in servicing its equipment. Assume also that the manufacturer
is the only seller of an unpatented replacement part for its equipment.
Under certain circumstances, 38 it would be illegal for the manufacturer to
condition sales of the part on the purchase of its service. Now suppose that
the manufacturer physically attached to the part an unrelated and worthless,
36. It is not incontestable because even if the motivation for creating intellectual property is to
gain profits unrelated to that intellectual property, those profits are still an incentive to create the
intellectual property. Moreover, the patents would have some value to society, regardless of the
motivation for their creation, because patent law has criteria for patentability that seek to ensure some
level of inventiveness that will benefit society. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1994). The case for
copyright is less clear, because the threshold requirement for originality is quite low. See Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
37. The test does not, however, have another weakness attributed to it by the Xerox district court.
That court said that Kodak failed to realize that intellectual property owners are always motivated by
seeking profits from their intellectual property. See In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.
(CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.), 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1141 (D. Kan. 1997). The Xerox court said that
under Kodak, "a company would be subject to antitrust liability for having a corporate memorandum
which states that the company plans to use its intellectual property rights to exclude competitors and
achieve a competitive advantage in the marketplace." Id. That is not true. The key issue in Kodak was
not whether the patentee was seeking "to exclude competitors and achieve a competitive advantage in
the marketplace," but whether it was truly using its intellectual property rights to do so. Kodak, 125
F.3d at 1219-20. This essay proposes a test for resolving that issue.
38. See supra notes 16-17 and text accompanying notes 22-25.
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but patented, invention. Should the addition of the patented invention
change the legality of the manufacturer's requirement that its service be
used to install the (combination) part? The answer, I think, is no, as even
leveraging defendants would probably agree.
A leveraging defendant would also say, of course, that its patented
inventions are truly useful parts of its products, not things tacked on merely
in order to claim patent protection. That is no doubt generally true, but is it
the relevant question? To test it, consider another variation on the
leveraging scenario. Suppose that the replacement part at issue was not
initially protected by a patent, but that the manufacturer made a patented
improvement to it. The improvement would certainly justify the
manufacturer in charging a higher price for the part,39 but should it make
permissible a requirement that buyers use the manufacturer's service if that
requirement was not permissible when the part contained no patented
invention?
I believe that the answer to this question is also no. To allow the
manufacturer to charge a monopoly price for the product with its patented
invention is to allow it a return on its intellectual property. To allow it also
to implement a tie that would otherwise be illegal, however, is to allow it a
return-an anticompetitive return-that has no necessary relation to the
manufacturer's intellectual property.40 Unless the manufacturer can show
some relationship between its invention (or copyright) and the leveraging
arrangement, its intellectual property should provide no special exemption
39. Indeed, although the Ninth Circuit in Kodak condemned the defendant's leveraging, it said
that it could charge whatever price it liked for its parts. See Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1224-26.
40. It has long been recognized that leveraging does not allow a seller to reap profits from its
power over the leveraging product more than once. It can take those profits in the leveraging market or
the leveraged market, but not in both. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE LJ. 19 (1957). Leveraging can, however, allow a seller more fully to exercise the
power it has in the leveraging market. That is, leveraging does not permit the seller to exercise its
power twice, but it may permit it to exercise power that it could not use when it was confined to a
single, non-discriminatory price. See Keith K. Wollenberg, An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Re-
examining the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REv. 737, 743-52 (1987). Whether leveraging in such
circumstances is procompetitive or anticompetitive is a matter of some dispute, but tying law condemns
it, at least for sellers that have market power. See supra note 16.
It is also unclear whether price discrimination in the licensing of intellectual property is
procompetitive or anticompetitive, but it is permissible. See infra note 44. The justification for this
different rule, of course, is the incentive it produces for the creation of inventions and expression. The
point in the text, then, is that where price discrimination would be illegal under antitrust law in the
absence of intellectual property, a seller that argues that its price discrimination should be legal because
it is based on intellectual property should be required to show that it is based not just on a product that
incorporates intellectual property, but on the intellectual property incorporated in that product.
20001 1141
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from the antitrust law. The following paragraphs discuss when such a
showing might be possible.
A. KODAK AND XEROX
The facts of Kodak and Xerox closely resembled those just discussed.
There were a large number of replacement parts for the equipment of each
manufacturer. Some of the parts were patented, but all of them were
denied to independent service organizations, 41 and in any event, the
manufacturers offered no explanation for why the patented inventions
would justify those denials.42 Indeed, the service organizations sought the
parts not because of whatever inventions were embodied in them, which
might in fact have improved the performance of the copiers, but because
they were the only available parts that fit the machines.
The benefits of whatever inventions were embodied in the parts
accrued to the equipment owners, not to the service organizations. That is
not to say that the independent service organizations would not have
preferred the patented parts, even if unpatented alternatives had been
available, but if they did have such preferences, they would have been
derived from those of their customers, the equipment owners. Therefore, it
cannot really be said that the manufacturers were denying their intellectual
property to the service organizations; instead, they were denying it to the
equipment owners, who used the service organizations.
As suggested above,43 the problem here is that the inventions in the
parts were not shown to have any relationship to the servicing that justified
the denial of the parts to the service organizations. This is apparent when
one considers the justification often offered for such leveraging
arrangements: price discrimination. The argument for price discrimination,
particularly in the intellectual property context, is that the manufacturer
41. Xerox allowed the equipment owners themselves to purchase the parts. See In re
Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (Creative Copier Servs. v. Xerox Corp.), 85 F. Supp. 2d 1130,
1146 (D. Kan. 2000); Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1133. Those owners could then hire independent service
organizations. But that still denied the parts to the service organizations qua service organizations, and
prevented them from maintaining the parts availability that they needed to offer an attractive service
package. See Creative Copier, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
42. This point provided much of the justification for the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Kodak's
reliance on its intellectual property rights was pretextual. See Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1219-20.
43. See supra text accompanying note 39.
44. Price discrimination is not generally a legal justification for a leveraging arrangement, but it
can be one in the intellectual property context. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 245 n.45
("Licensing agreements containing discriminatory rates do not violate the Robinson-Patman Act, which
applies only to 'commodities."').
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ought to be able to charge those who value its invention highly a high price
and those who value it less a lower price. In that way, more buyers will
have access to the invention, and society will benefit.45
It is unclear, though, how denying patented inventions to independent
service organizations could further this goal. It is true that a manufacturer
could charge supracompetitive prices for service and thus effectively
charge a higher price to those owners who make greater use of their
equipment (and require more service). If these heavy-use owners valued
the equipment more highly, as seems plausible, this could be an effective
method of price discrimination. However, if price discrimination in the
absence of patents is impermissible,46 the question is not whether using
leverage to gain control over service allows the manufacturer to
discriminate in the price of the equipment, but whether it allows it to
discriminate in the price of the patented inventions.
The policies of Kodak and Xerox did not allow them to discriminate
based on buyers' valuations of the inventions, rather than on their
valuations of the equipment as a whole (if they in fact did that). It was
generally the patented parts that required replacement most often.
47
Therefore, the manufacturer could have discriminated among buyers
simply by charging a higher price for the patented parts. That is, the parts
themselves could have served as a metering device. There was no need, if
the discrimination was in fact based on the patents, to make service the
vehicle of that discrimination.4 8  Indeed, service pricing would be an
inaccurate discrimination device to the extent that customers' valuations of
the inventions were not exactly correlated with their service needs.
Thus, the imposition of leveraging arrangements in Kodak and Xerox
had no apparent relation to the manufacturers' intellectual property. It is
true that the tie might have enabled the manufacturers to extract higher
returns from their intellectual property, and that seemed to be sufficient for
45. The high return for the owner will also benefit society in that it will create a greater incentive
for the creation of intellectual property, and (perfect) price discrimination creates no monopoly
deadweight loss.
46. We must make that assumption because the goal here is not to determine whether price
discrimination is procompetitive in general, but whether, if it is anticompetitive, or at least illegal, the
presence of intellectual property should make it permissible. See supra note 40.
47. See In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (Creative Copier Servs. v. Xerox Corp.),
85 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1146, 1147-48 (D. Kan. 2000) ("Xerox has patents on the fuser/heat rolls... and
the photoreceptor belts and dicorotrons .... For the average life of a... copier, photoreceptors are the
number one cost of servicing, fuser rolls are the number two cost and dicorotrons are the number five
cost.").
48. Even more straightforwardly, the manufacturer could simply have charged license fees for
the invention itself that discriminated among the owners. See supra note 44.
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the court in Xerox.49 But the same rationale would allow a manufacturer
with a patent on product A to impose a tie between products B and C. That
is not the law,50 but it could be said to describe the facts in Kodak and
Xerox.5 1  To justify their denials of their parts to independent service
organizations, the defendants in those cases should have been required to
explain how those denials were related to their intellectual property.52
B. DATA GENERAL
In Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., a
computer manufacturer, Data General, denied Grumman, an independent
service organization, access to its copyrighted computer program,
MY/ADEX, which was used in diagnosing computer problems.53 In this
case, the service organization did indeed seek to use the intellectual
property of the equipment manufacturer. In copying MV/ADEX and in
running the program, the service organization would have been using Data
General's copyrighted expression. Moreover, it was only the service
organization that would have used MVIADEX; the equipment owners
would have had no occasion to use it once their machines were repaired.54
49. See Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1138-39.
50. As described above, though, it might be economically efficient if the profits otherwise
provided by the manufacturer's intellectual property were insufficient to encourage production of that
property.
51. In those cases, product A is the manufacturer's invention, product B is an unpatented
(perhaps hypothetical) version of the part in which the manufacturer's invention is embodied, and C is
the manufacturer's service. The equipment owner needs product B to keep its equipment running. If
the part were available in an unpatented version, the manufacturer would not be permitted to require
that the owner purchase C, the manufacturer's service, in order to obtain it. But by adding A, the
patented invention, the manufacturer can, under Xerox, require the purchase of C, without showing that
the requirement is related to the invention. It is immaterial whether the unpatented part is only
hypothetical; the essential point is that the source of the equipment owner's leverage over the owner is
not the invention but the owner's need for the part (patented or unpatented).
52. This seems to have been the view of the European Court of Justice in AB Volvo v. Erik Veng
(UK) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] ECR 6211. The court there refused to require Volvo to license its body
panel designs to third parties, because, the court said, Volvo's refusal to license those designs
"constitutes the very subject-matter of [its] exclusive right." Id. 1 8. The court noted, however, that
"the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers" would be "abusive conduct." Id.
19. See also Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Mischo, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., Case
238/87, [19881 ECR 6211, 28 (referring to "discriminatory conditions of sale (refusal to supply spare
parts to independent repairers, for instance)").
53. 36F.3d 1147,1154(lst Cir. 1994).
54. In this respect, Data General differs from those cases in which computer manufacturers have
sought not only to deny service organizations their diagnostic software, but also to deny them operating
system software. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993);
Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 360 (E.D. Va. 1994).
Because operating system software is necessary to enable the computer to run any other software, it
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These facts present a better case for leveraging than do those in Kodak
and Xerox, for two related reasons. First, in Data General there was in fact
a relationship between the intellectual property at issue-computer
servicing software-and the market in which the competitive effect was
felt-computer servicing. Second, there was a plausible argument that the
leveraging arrangement was necessary to achieve a possibly procompetitive
effect-price discrimination. Because the software, unlike the patented
parts in Kodak and Xerox, would be purchased only once, price
discrimination could not be achieved by pricing it at a supracompetitive
level. 55
The likelihood that price discrimination, or some procompetitive
justification, was at issue in Data General is increased by the fact that the
MVIADEX software was not necessary to keep the equipment running.
That is, it was possible to perform service on the equipment without the
MV/ADEX program. In a sense, then, there was an alternative
"uncopyrighted product" available,56 in that performing service with the aid
of no program was possible. Hence, those who chose the copyrighted
product did so because they preferred it, and thus paid whatever premium
was required to use Data General service because they valued the software.
If the alternative of servicing the equipment without Data General's
protected work had not been available, whether the leveraging should have
been permissible is somewhat less clear. For example, imagine that Data
General had denied independent service organizations access to a patented
device necessary for installing some essential, but unpatented and widely
available, replacement part.57 In this case, Data General could have
argued, just as it could have for the computer program, that the patented
device would be more highly valued by those who required the replacement
part more often, but that it could sell the patented device only once.
Therefore, price discrimination through service pricing might have been a
reasonable approach.
would be needed by the service organization regardless of whether it used the manufacturer's diagnostic
software. Indeed, it would be needed regardless of whether the computer was being serviced at all,
which indicates that in these cases the manufacturer was not seeking a return related to its development
of the operating system software.
55. Data General could perhaps have used characteristics of the buyers or licensees as its basis
for price discrimination, and thus discriminated even in single purchases, but that would likely have
been a less precise approach than using service needs.
56. Cf.supranote5l.
57. Assume also that it was the invention embodied in the device, not some other aspect of the
device, which was necessary for the installation.
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The situation would have been different, though, if the patented device
were used to install an essential replacement part that was patented, or over
which Data General otherwise held a monopoly.5 8  In that case, as was
described above in the Kodak-Xerox context, Data General would not have
had to resort to service pricing in order to price discriminate, but could
simply have set the price of the replacement part so as to effectively charge
a higher price to those who installed more of those parts, and thus
presumably valued the patented device more highly.59  The key
consideration in deciding which of these scenarios applies is whether the
manufacturer's denial or discriminatory grant of its intellectual property is
related to buyers' or licensees' use of that property.
C. OTHER FACTUAL CONTEXTS
In all of the cases discussed above-Kodak, Xerox, and Data
General-the manufacturers appeared to be discriminating against
independent service organizations. There is an alternative to this sort of
user-based discrimination: use-based discrimination. Because the Federal
Circuit has said that field-of-use restrictions on intellectual property
licenses are generally permissible,60  a manufacturer might seek to
accomplish its goal through that means. It is important, however, to
distinguish true field-of-use restrictions from restrictions that appear to be
based on use, but are in fact based on users.
One of these disguised restrictions was in fact also presented in Data
General. Data General refused to allow some of its equipment owners to
license MV/ADEX, but permitted others to do so. Specifically, it licensed
the software to those who used it-those who serviced their own
equipment-but refused to license it to owners who did not use the
software-those who hired service organizations. 61 This practice appeared
to discriminate based on the use of Data General's intellectual property,
58. In the absence of intellectual property protection, Data General might have had a monopoly
over sales of one of its replacement parts because, for example, it had economies of scale, which others
could not match, in producing the part.
59. It might be argued that if the manufacturer could use service pricing to discriminate, it should
be permitted to do so, even if it could also use parts pricing to accomplish the same goal. The point,
though, is that the existence of intellectual property does not permit anything; the manufacturer's
actions must be considered against a background in which antitrust law forbids tying and intellectual
property law forbids going beyond "the scope of the patent." See supra notes 9 & 16. Therefore, it is
reasonable to require the manufacturer to use the means that most closely accomplish its stated goals.
60. See B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419,1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[-]ield of use
restrictions ... are generally upheld .... ).
61. See Data Gen., 36 F.3d at 1154. There was no need for those equipment owners who used
Data General service to license the software, because the software then was used by Data General.
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suggesting that it was a valid use of the property. However, although the
equipment owners who hired independent service organizations would not
have used the software themselves, the service organizations, as their
agents, would have. It is unclear why Data General should be permitted to
discriminate between those who use its intellectual property as principals
and those who allow their agents to use the property.62
In this respect, one can compare Data General with B. Braun Medical
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories.63  In Braun, the Federal Circuit found
erroneous the district court's use of a jury instruction that defined as patent
misuse a patent holder's use of conditional sales of the patented product.
The restrictions at issue in Braun allowed Abbott to attach Braun's
needleless syringe directly to an intravenous line, but did not allow
attachment to an "extension set," which the court said would have
"permit[ted] the delivery of additional fluids and drugs." 64 The court's
view was that in the case of a field-of-use restriction, it is "reasonable to
infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the
'use' rights conferred by the patentee."6 5
This sort of restriction on the use of a protected product is more
closely tied to the underlying intellectual property protection than is a
restriction on the user of the protected product. The Federal Circuit said as
much in another field-of-use case:
Should the restriction be found to be reasonably within the patent grant,
i.e., that it relates to subject matter within the scope of the patent claims,
that ends the inquiry. However, should such inquiry lead to the
conclusion that there are anticompetitive effects extending beyond the
patentee's statutory right to exclude, these effects do not automatically
impeach the restriction.66
Because the patent defines an invention, which in many cases will have a
variety of uses, it is reasonable to believe that discrimination among those
uses is within the scope of the grant, in a way that discrimination among
those implementing the same use is not. Indeed, the courts have found
62. Cf In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (Creative Copier Servs. v. Xerox Corp.), 85
F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1147 (D. Kan. 2000) (quoting a Xerox letter to an equipment owner, stating that
"Xerox will not deal with an end-user through an independent service organization acting as the user's
agent or intermediary.").
63. 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
64. Id.at1422&n.l.
65. Id. at 1426.
66. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700,708 (Fed. Cir. 1992). For a discussion of
the implications of Mallinckrodt, see Richard H. Stem, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions After
Mallinckrodt-An Idea in Search ofDefinition, 5 ALB. LJ. Sci. & TECH. 1 (1994).
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restrictions on users not to be within the patent grant, though they generally
do not characterize the question in that way.67
Returning to Data General, it seems clear that Data General's
discrimination in licensing to equipment owners that did not use
independent service organizations but not to those that did use them was
not "relate[d] to subject matter within the scope of" Data General's
protection for its copyrighted expression.6 8 The situation might have been
different, though, if Data General had shown that there was some
difference in use, or even extent of use, between the two classes of
equipment owners. If, for example, those owners that used service
organizations did so because they used their equipment much more
intensively, and thus required more service, the restriction could possibly
have been defended as a use restriction.
69
In fact, the Federal Circuit has treated intensity-of-use restrictions as
field-of-use restrictions, upholding a license limited to a single use in
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.70 Although one could perhaps argue
that restrictions based on intensity of use are not best described as related to
the "field" of use, they do appear useful in discriminating among customers
based on their valuations of the intellectual property at issue, just as field-
of-use restrictions are. Indeed, Data General's refusal to license its
software to independent service organizations can be characterized in this
way, as a means of denying use of the software to those who would use it
more than a certain amount. The Kodak and Xerox restrictions cannot be
characterized in this way, because in those cases the service organizations
did not in fact "use" the patented parts at all.
IV. THE STATUTES AND "UNILATERAL" REFUSALS TO DEAL
The leveraging in many of the recent cases-including Kodak, Xerox,
and Data General-is accomplished through actions by the intellectual
property holders that are at least formally unilateral. Consequently, to the
extent that the leveraging law discussed above71 arose from cases under
67. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973); Unidisco, Inc. v. Schattner,
824 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
68. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. The analogy drawn here is between a patented invention and
copyrighted expression, on the one hand, and the unpatented elements of a part embodying a patented
invention and the uncopyrightable ideas incorporated in a copyrighted work, on the other. See infra
Part IV.B.
69. In such circumstances, for example, Data General might have sought to price discriminate
among the heavy users, where such discrimination might be profitable, while ignoring the other users.
70. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
71. See supra Part II.
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section 1 of the Sherman Act, which requires an agreement, that law is
inapplicable to the recent cases. Instead, if the leveraging test proposed
here were to be adopted, it would have to be pursuant to an interpretation of
the patent and copyright statutes. The following paragraphs discuss
whether the test would be consistent with those statutes.
A. PATENT LAW
Patent law forbids the infringement of a "patented invention."72 One
"infringes" the invention if one "makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" it.73 A
service organization that buys and installs a part that incorporates a
patented invention certainly does not "make" that invention. It seems
reasonably clear, also, that the service organization does not "use" the
invention if, as the test proposed here requires, the organization simply
installs the part, and the invention does not play a role in the installation.
A more difficult question is whether the service organization "sells"
(or "offers to sell") the invention. If what the organization offers for sale is
its service, in which parts are included, but it does not sell the
manufacturer's parts independently of that service, it seems that a
reasonable argument can be made that it does not "sell" the parts. That
would especially be so if the organization priced the parts at its cost. In
any event, a service organization would not perform any forbidden acts if it
simply installed a part purchased by the equipment owner, yet such
purchases are sometimes forbidden by manufacturers if the part is to be
installed by an independent service organization.74
More broadly, the distinction between an invention and the particular
product in which it is embodied is one specifically recognized by patent
law. The distinction, in fact, is a central one in the use of commercial
success as evidence of the nonobviousness of an invention. The rationale
for the use of the commercial success test is that an invention that meets
with such success was presumably nonobvious, else the commercial need
would previously have been met. Patent law recognizes, though, that the
success of the product in which the invention at issue is embodied must be
due to the invention, not to some other factor, for this test to serve its
intended purpose. Thus, the Federal Circuit has said that commercial
success "must be shown to have in some way been due to the nature of the
72. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
73. Id.
74. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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claimed invention, as opposed to other economic and commercial factors
unrelated to the technical quality of the patented subject matter."75
Furthermore, the "other economic and commercial factors" recognized
by patent law include the market position and economies of scale that
could, as suggested above,76 give a provider of replacement parts the power
to force buyers to take its service. For example, in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the court noted that "the position of Schwinn
as a national leader in the design and manufacture of bicycles" may have
been "largely responsible for the success of the design [for a bicycle
seat]. ' 77 This point would seem to apply a fortiori to the manufacturer of
equipment selling replacement parts for its own equipment. The courts
have also recognized the importance of scale economies in commercial
success. 78 In sum, patent law offers ample reason to reject the view that the
leveraging power of a product embodying an invention is necessarily a
product of that invention.
It has been suggested, notably by the Xerox court, that leveraging is
permitted by a provision of the 1988 legislation that changed the law of
patent misuse:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement... of a
patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having... (4) refused to
license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of
any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the
acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a
separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner
has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented
product on which the license or sale is conditioned.79
Xerox relied on subsection (4),80 but that subsection refers to a wholesale
refusal to license the patent, rather than to selective licensing, as the
75. Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
76. See supra note 58.
77. 444 F.2d 295,300 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d
309, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding district court's finding that commercial success of recorder pen
design was largely attributable to market leadership and "extensive advertising").
78. See American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 360 F.2d 977, 990 (8th Cir.
1966) (concluding an enumeration of the possible explanations for the commercial success of the
plaintiffs' product with the observation that "[l]ast, but not least, plaintiffs have developed an
organization for the manufacture and sale of these devices that is international in scope").
79. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994).
80. See Brief for Defendant-Appellee Xerox Corporation at 25-32, In re Independent Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig. (CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.), 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 99-1323).
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legislative history makes clear.81 A manufacturer in Xerox's position
generally cannot refuse entirely to license the patents that are embodied in
its parts, because those parts are necessary for the manufacturer's
equipment. Instead, the manufacturer engages in selective licensing or
sales, dealing with equipment owners but not with service organizations,
or, as described above, with only certain equipment owners.
This sort of selective approach appears to implicate not subsection (4)
but subsection (5), because access to parts is effectively conditioned on the
additional purchase of the manufacturer's service. Xerox argued that this is
not true, because subsection (5) applies only to "certain tying
arrangements, arrangements that already violate the antitrust laws." 82 The
"conditioning" referred to by subsection (5) is, however, broader than the
explicit agreement that is required under tying law. A patentee can
unilaterally "condition" a license on the purchase of another product
without requiring an explicit agreement to make that purchase.
Such "conditioning" was present in Data General. In an earlier case
on similar facts,83 Data General argued that it did not condition the license
to its protected work84 on the purchase of its service. Instead, it said, it
licensed its work without conditions to equipment owners who did their
own service, and refused entirely to license its work to equipment owners
who hired independent service organizations. The court accepted this
argument, in a sense, stating that Data General's licensing decisions were
unilateral, lacking a conditional contract that would implicate section 1 of
the Sherman Act.8
5
But the absence of a contract does not necessarily imply the absence
of conditioning. Those equipment owners that hired Data General for
service, and only those equipment owners, got access to its protected work.
81. With regard to subsection (4), the legislative history cites two cases, both of which involved
complete refusals to license patents, not conditional or selective licensing. See 134 CONG. REC.
H10646, H10648 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (citing Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,
210 U.S. 405 (1908); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Moreover, the legislative history of earlier versions of what became the 1988 legislation makes
clear that the law was intended only "to reform the doctrine of patent misuse so it will not be used to
restrict the rights of patent owners when their licensing practices do not violate the antitrust laws." S.
REP. No. 100-492, at 2 (1988). The history reveals no intent to make conditional or selective licensing
per se legal.
82. See Brief for Xerox at31,Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322 (No. 99-1323).
83. See Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
84. In Data General, the work at issue was copyrighted, not patented, but the issues are the same.
85. See Service & Training, 963 F.2d at 685-88. The Frst Circuit's Data General decision
reached a similar conclusion, but did so only after reviewing the evidence from which an agreement
might have been inferred. See Data Gen., 36 F.3d at 1179,1180-81.
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There is no indication that 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) was only intended to
apply to explicit agreements. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has described the
section broadly, stating that it makes it an "impermissible broadening" of
the patent grant to "us[e] a patent which enjoys market power in the
relevant market to restrain competition in an unpatented product. '8 6
Therefore, so long as the manufacturer has market power, as required
by § 271(d)(5), it seems that the licensing approach challenged in Kodak
and Xerox is not protected by the 1988 legislation. The requirement of
market power, though long a part of antitrust law,87 has not always been
part of the law of patent misuse. Thus, the 1988 act, whose legislative
history indicates that it was intended to conform misuse law to antitrust
law,88 can reasonably be read to do so by requiring that market power be
shown by a plaintiff arguing that a licensing arrangement conditioned on
the purchase of an unpatented product is misuse. In this way, subsection
(5) is given some content, without reducing it to a simple duplication of
antitrust tying law, as some (including Xerox) have argued.8 9
B. COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression," 90 and, as relevant here, one infringes a copyright
when one "reproduce[s] the copyrighted work" or "distribute[s] copies ...
of the copyrighted work."91  This does not offer the freedom of
interpretation of patent law; any reproduction appears to violate the statute,
regardless of whether that reproduction is by one who uses the software.
However, there are two possible exceptions: the exclusion of "ideas" and
"methods of operation" from protection, and the fair use doctrine.
"In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which
it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."92 This
idea-expression dichotomy, as it is often known, shares an important
similarity with the approach to leveraging proposed in this essay-it
distinguishes between the protected work and the product in which it is
86. B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
87. See supra note 16.
88. See supra note 81.
89. See Brief for Xerox at 25-32, Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322 (No. 99-1323).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
91. Id. § 106(l), (3).
92. Id. § 102(b).
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sold or licensed. That is, copyright law acknowledges explicitly that only
the expressive portion of the product is protected, in the same way that I
propose that only the patented invention that is sold as part of a product is
protected.
Copyright decisions have recognized this distinction in explicitly
rejecting copyright owners' efforts to deny others access to their
unprotected work. The problem in the copyright context is that, whereas a
service organization can install a patented part without making, using, or
selling an invention embodied in it, it is not always possible to make use of
the underlying ideas in a copyrighted work without also copying the work's
protected expression. Courts usually solve this problem by applying the
fair use doctrine. 9
3
Fair use is generally intended to address certain circumstances in
which it is thought to be desirable to allow the use of protected expression.
That is, it is not specifically aimed at those instances in which a user seeks
to make an incidental copy of the protected expression to gain access to an
underlying, and unprotected, idea. Nevertheless, courts have applied the
fair use doctrine to permit such copying.94 The cases have generally arisen
when a user copies a protected computer program to reverse-engineer it-
to determine how the program works-in order to create another program
that performs the same or a related function.95
In such cases, the courts' decisions have generally turned on whether
the program that the user creates can itself be viewed as an infringement of
the original copyright owner's copyright.96 That is, if the user copies the
93. See id. § 107. Another possible solution would be to apply 17 U.S.C. § 117, which states that
it is not infringement to copy a computer program provided that the copy "is created as an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other
manner." Id. § 117(a)(1). The courts are undecided, however, with regard to the applicability of this
section in the reverse engineering context. Compare Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Section 117 does not purport to protect a user who disassembles object
code, converts it from assembly into source code, and makes printouts and photocopies of the refined
source code version."), with Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 600
(9th Cir. 2000) (stating that court's application of the fair use doctrine made it unnecessary to address
the applicability of 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1)).
94. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act affirms the view that reverse engineering is not
necessarily a copyright violation. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (Supp. 1998) (permitting the circumvention
of technological copy protection measures for the purpose of reverse engineering, so long as the reverse
engineering itself is not an infringement).
95. See Connectix, 203 F.3d at 596; Sega, 977 F.2d at 1510; Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844-45 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
96. See Connectix, 203 F.3d at 602 ("'Where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the
ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a
legitimate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter
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original program, but the program that the user produces is a non-infringing
one, the copying will be treated as a fair use.9 7 If, on the other hand, the
user copies the original program and produces an infringing program, the
copying will not be viewed as a fair use.
98
In other words, a formal infringement-the copying of the original
program-is not generally illegal if the user's goal is a non-infringing
use-the production of a non-infringing program. One can apply this rule,
extending it only slightly, to the patent context of Kodak and Xerox.
Assume that in those cases the independent service organizations were able
to obtain access to the manufacturers' patented parts (because, say, the
manufacturers had licensed them to equipment owners), but that the
manufacturers were not willing to license their use by the service
organizations. Then one could argue that if the service organizations used
the parts anyway, their formal infringement-the use of the patented
parts-was done with the goal of engaging in a competing, and non-
infringing use-servicing the owners' equipment.99
This is not to say, of course, that the copyright fair use law applied in
the context of the reverse engineering of computer software is applicable in
any direct way in the patent context.00 But it is telling that in copyright
law, where the difference between the protected work and the product in
which it is embodied is explicitly acknowledged in the idea-expression
dichotomy, the courts reject efforts to extend legal rights over the protected
work to unprotected aspects of the product.
of law."') (quoting Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527-28) (emphasis added by Connectix); Atari, 975 F.2d at 843
("[R]everse engineering object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair
use.").
97. See Connectix, 203 F.3d at 606 ("Sony does not claim that the [defendant's program] itself
contains object code that infringes Sony's copyright."). Cf Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527-28 (concluding that
the defendant's reverse engineering was a fair use, but observing that that "conclusion does not, of
course, insulate [the defendant] from a claim of copyright infringement with respect to its finished
products").
98. See Atari, 975 F.2d at 844-45 ("Mhe trial court detected similarities between the programs
beyond the similarities necessary to accommodate the programming environment, or similarities
necessary to embody the unprotectable idea, process, or method of the... program.").
99. The service organizations would not be prevented from using this argument by the fact that
their ultimate goal was to compete with the intellectual property owner. See Connectx, 203 F.3d at
606.
100. However, Julie Cohen and Mark Lemley have recently relied on points similar to those made
here in arguing that the scope of patent protection for computer software should be limited. See Julie E.
Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry 89 CAL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2001). They argue that "the majority of software patents... cover only a single part of a
computer program," so that reverse engineering of computer programs should be permitted to allow
access to the unpatented portions of the programs. Id. (manuscript at 23-24) (available at
http'//papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?ABSTRAC'_-D=209668>).
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V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
The distinction proposed in this essay between a protected work and
the commercial product in which it is embodied is of value beyond the
specific context of leveraging. Indeed, although it is sometimes
overlooked, I believe it is fundamental to intellectual property law. The
following paragraphs discuss three ways in which the distinction is
significant.
A. INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLIES AND PRODUCT MONOPOLIES
A leveraging claim requires the use of power in one market to gain an
advantage in another. The district court in Xerox rejected the plaintiff's
reliance on the Ninth Circuit's Kodak decision in part because it believed
that the Ninth Circuit had misunderstood the relationship between the parts
and service markets:
We begin with a discussion of the distinction between a "patent
monopoly" and an "economic monopoly." The scope of a "patent
monopoly" is defined by the claims of the patent, not by the limits of
what a court determines is the most analogous antitrust market. On the
other hand, an "economic monopoly," as we have used the term, refers to
a firm's power to control the price of a product in a properly defined
relevant antitrust market.
We believe that the Ninth Circuit in Kodak, in reaching its
conclusion, implicitly assumed that a single patent can create at most a
single "inherent" economic monopoly .... There is no unlawful
leveraging of monopoly power when a patent holder merely exercises its
rights inherent in the patent grant. In other words, to the extent Xerox
gained its monopoly power in any market by unilaterally refusing to
license its patents, such conduct is permissible under the antitrust laws.
Xerox's legal right to exclude [independent service organizations] in the
service markets from using Xerox's patented inventions arose from its
patents, not from an unlawful leveraging of its monopoly power in the
parts market.101
There are in fact three, not two, "markets" in the Xerox context, and
the district court confused them. First, there is what the court called the
"patent monopoly," which is defined by the claims of the patent. Second,
there is a relevant antitrust market-what the court called the "economic
monopoly"-in which the product in which the invention is embodied is
sold. Third, and occupying a conceptual position somewhere between
101. Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1134-35 (citations omitted).
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these two, is the product in which the invention is embodied. This
"market"-or, more properly, the control which the patentee possesses over
the product-is no more narrow than the invention and no more broad than
a relevant antitrust market.
The court was correct in stating that it is the economic monopoly that
matters for leveraging purposes; only economically relevant leveraging is
important, at least to antitrust law. The court was too quick, though, in
suggesting that Xerox's power to exclude independent service
organizations from the replacement parts market "arose from its
patents." 102 If there were no alternative unpatented products available,
Xerox's power might have arisen not from equipment owners' desire for its
patented inventions, but from their need for replacement parts that fit
Xerox equipment, regardless of whether those parts incorporated Xerox's
patented inventions. As discussed above, there might have been other
reasons why no alternative parts were available. It might have been, for
example, that the economies of scale were such that only Xerox could
effectively compete in the market for its replacement parts.10 3
Actually, the Xerox court did not say that Xerox's market control
arose from its patents. Rather, it said that "Xerox's legal right to exclude
[independent service organizations] in the service markets from using
Xerox's patented inventions arose from its patents."'14 But the focus on
the source of Xerox's "legal right to exclude" is exactly wrong. The issue
is the source of Xerox's economic ability to exclude, not its legal right to
do so; that is the point of the court's focus on the "economic monopoly."
In order to be allowed to defend its leveraging by pointing to a legal right,
Xerox should be required to show that it is in fact that legal right that is the
source of its economic leveraging power.
B. A Focus ON USERS
In another respect, though, the Xerox court's focus on economic
market power is exactly right. In antitrust law in general, and in tying law
102. Id. at 1135.
103. This point was made in another parts-leveraging case, Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med.
Sys., Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15997 (N.D. Ga. 1994). The court in Servicetrends, after noting that
the replacement components of a patented shocktube assembly were not themselves patented, so that
"any other manufacturer can legally duplicate them," noted that "[o]f course, whether production of
these specialized parts is economically feasible in a competitive market is not a legal question." Id. at
*2. In fact, the plaintiff service organization apparently was unable to interest a manufacturer in
producing the parts. Id.
104. Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1135 (emphasis added).
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in particular, relevant antitrust markets are defined by looking at the nature
of consumer demand. Thus, a relevant antitrust market is one in which a
price increase above the competitive level will be profitable because
consumers do not have available to them satisfactory substitute products.
The test I propose in this essay adopts a similar consumer-oriented, or
user-oriented, perspective. Specifically, to determine whether an
intellectual property owner is truly exploiting its intellectual property, I
propose that the focus be on the use of that property. The owner should be
permitted to show either of two things. First, if the owner is denying the
property to one who would use the intellectual aspect of the property, the
denial should be permissible, absent some other abuise of the intellectual
property right. Second, if the owner is discriminating among users in
providing access to the property in a manner that is based on the uses to
which the intellectual aspect of the property is put, the discrimination
should be permissible.
This approach avoids two problems. On the one hand, it avoids the
Xerox district court's equation of patent rights over an invention with
economic control of the product in which the invention is embodied. It
thus avoids, as described above, a focus on legal rights when the real issue
is the economic one of leveraging. On the other hand, it avoids the Ninth
Circuit's focus in Kodak on the subjective intent of the intellectual property
owner. It is not fruitful to ask if the owner's "intent" is to exploit its
intellectual property; in a subjective sense, it always is. The important
question is whether the exploitation is one that will promote the goals of
intellectual property law, and it will do so only when the property that is
being exploited is truly intellectual.
A user-oriented focus is also useful in contexts beyond leveraging.
An example is the recent controversy regarding reach-through licenses of
biotechnological research tools. 1 5 Such licenses give the owner of a
research tool rights in the discoveries made using that tool. 10 6 Thus, the
effective price paid under the license is not based on the nature of the use
made of the intellectual property, but on the results achieved by that use.
One could argue that the licenses are a means of price discrimination, in
that they allow the property owner to charge a low base price, while
charging higher prices only to licensees whose research is successful. The
105. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENcE 698,699 (1998).
106. See id. "Such rights may take the form of a royalty on sales that result from use of the
upstream research tool, an exclusive or nonexclusive license on future discoveries, or an option to
acquire such a license." Id. at 699.
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question, though, should not be whether the licenses allow price
discrimination, but whether they effect price discrimination based on the
use of the owner's intellectual property. In fact, they do not, instead basing
the discrimination on the success of the licensee's research. In that way,
they lessen the incentive for such downstream research, and may
discourage the very innovation that intellectual property is intended to
promote.10 7
C. THE INTEL CASES
A focus on users also illuminates the recent cases alleging that Intel
Corporation used its intellectual property to discourage others from
challenging its alleged infringement of their intellectual property.t 08 Intel's
general policy was to release early versions of its microprocessors and
information about those microprocessors to buyers who incorporated its
processors in their computers. However, when several of those buyers
independently sued Intel, claiming that it had infringed their intellectual
property, Intel conditioned their continued access to its processors and
information on their terminations of the infringement suits. Thus, Intel's
discriminatory practices were unrelated to its potential licensees' uses of its
intellectual property, and were based instead on whether those licensees
had asserted their own intellectual property rights against Intel.
The approach proposed in this essay would make Intel's actions
impermissible. The argument it made in defending its actions was much
the same as the district court's in Xerox: an intellectual property owner is
entitled to any returns it can get on its intellectual property. As in Xerox,
though, it was true only in the broadest sense that Intel's returns were
returns on intellectual property. To be sure, they were made possible by its
possession of intellectual property, but they were not a product of the
intellectual element of that property. 10 9 The returns would also have been
possible had Intel only had monopoly control of some other, unprotected
107. See id. at 698. Heller and Eisenberg discuss the general inhibitory effect that these licenses
may have on research, but they do not focus on the user-oriented perspective adopted here.
108. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Complaint, In re Intel
Corp. (FTC No. 9288) (available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.htm>).
109. Another commentator recently made a similar point:
mhe policy rationale underlying those cases [allowing denials of intellectual property] is to
encourage innovation by ensuring that one's competitors will not be able to free ride on one's
investment. Intel could not, of course, and did not, argue that the reason why it withheld the
confidential information about next generation microprocessors, and samples of such
products, from some of its customers was to prevent them from competing with Intel using
that information.
Davis, supra note 1, at 51.
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property. Under an understanding of intellectual property that permits only
uses of that property that provide returns related to the actual intellectual
contribution that the property rights are designed to encourage, Intel's
argument is incorrect. To justify its actions, Intel should have been
required to point to some way in which its denial of access to its property
related to its protected intellectual elements.
The nature of Intel's settlement with the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) is consistent with this conclusion:
[Intel] shall cease and desist from... (1) impeding, altering, suspending,
withdrawing, withholding or refusing to provide access by any
microprocessor customer to [Advance Technical] Information for
reasons related to an Intellectual Property Dispute with such customer if
at the time of such [Intellectual Property] Dispute such customer is
receiving [Advance Technical] Information from Respondent or (2)
basing any supply decisions for general purpose microprocessors upon
the existence of an [Intellectual Property] Dispute.110
Thus, the settlement prohibits Intel from discriminating among customers
on the basis of some other intellectual property dispute which is unrelated
to Intel's own intellectual property rights.! '
The settlement has an important exception, though:
[The provisions set forth above] shall be inapplicable with regard to any
[Advance Technical] Information or product supply decision specific to
any Intel microprocessor that the customer has asserted is infringing its
patent, copyright or trade secret rights unless that customer agrees in
writing not to seek an injunction against the manufacture, use, sale, offer
to sell, or importation of all Intel microprocessors that are based upon the
same core microarchitecture... as the Intel microprocessor that is the
subject of the assertion of iringement .... 112
110. Agreement Containing Consent Order I Il.A, In re Intel Corp. (FTC No. 9288) (available at
<http'lwww.ftc.govlos1999/9903/dO9288inteagreement.htm>).
Ill. It is worth noting that the Commission's complaint relied in part on the fact that the market
in which Intel sought to exercise its leverage was itself a market of intellectual property:
Because patent rights are an important means of promoting innovation, Intel's coercive tactics
to force customers to license away such rights diminishes the incentives of any firm
dependent on Intel to develop microprocessor-related technologies. Because most firms who
own or are developing such technologies are vulnerable to retaliation from Intel, the natural
and probable effect of Intel's conduct is to diminish the incentives of the industry to develop
new and improved microprocessor and related technologies.
Intel Complaint 39, In re Intel Corp. (FTC No. 9288). Under the test proposed in this essay, that is of
no importance.
112. Intel Settlement Agreement I II.A, In re Intel Corp. (FTC No. 9288).
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This exception, too, is consistent with the proposal of this essay. It permits
Intel to discriminate among its customers (by denying them information or
processors) to the extent that those customers are seeking an injunction that
would forbid Intel from selling its own products, and thus from using
Intel's own intellectual property. That basis for discrimination is thus
related directly to the intellectual property that Intel sought to deny, and the
FTC was correct to permit such discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
Not all apparent conflicts between antitrust law and intellectual
property law are real conflicts. When an intellectual property owner
selectively sells or licenses its property in a way that bears no relation to
potential purchasers' or licensees' uses of the protected aspects of that
property, no interest in intellectual property is being vindicated. Hence, in
such circumstances the intellectual property should provide no special
exemption from the antitrust laws. Indeed, licensing practices of this kind
should be characterized as misuse of the intellectual property.
This proposal would likely change little with respect to copyright law,
which already achieves similar results through the distinction it draws
between protected expression and unprotected ideas. Patent law, however,
has generally drawn no such distinction between protected inventions and
the unprotected aspects of the products in which those inventions are
embodied. Adoption of the approach proposed here would therefore
reconcile copyright and patent law in this important respect, and thereby
clarify the nature of intellectual property.
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